摘要 :
Policies are not an end in themselves, but deliberate systems of principles to guide decisions and achievement of rational outcomes. Many factors inherent in or transcending policy processes have dramatic consequences for how poli...
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Policies are not an end in themselves, but deliberate systems of principles to guide decisions and achievement of rational outcomes. Many factors inherent in or transcending policy processes have dramatic consequences for how policies are interpreted and applied. In this article, wedeploy the concept of ‘policy gridlocks’ to better understand factors that facilitate or hinder implementation of single or multiple policies in different African policy arenas. We argue that minimizing or ameliorating ‘policy gridlocks’ requires stakeholders to quantifyand more directly feel the cost of their decisions and actions, while scholars must continue to search for institutional means to prevent gridlocks, including broadening the array of conceptual and analytical tools for understanding policy processes. We conclude that limits in financial resources,technical expertise and legislative capacity are the more powerful drivers of policy formulation, implementation and revision gridlocks that need to be addressed, than fragmentation of stakeholder interests.
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摘要 :
I consider a dynamic model of bargaining where alternatives to the status quo arrive stochastically during the bargaining process, the proposer can bundle multiple alternatives into a single proposal, and a forward-looking voter e...
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I consider a dynamic model of bargaining where alternatives to the status quo arrive stochastically during the bargaining process, the proposer can bundle multiple alternatives into a single proposal, and a forward-looking voter elects the agenda-setter. I show that the prevailing wisdom that policy bundling reduces gridlock-by facilitating compromise across different policy areas-is incomplete. Policy bundling can also increase gridlock: a player may veto or delay a bipartisan alternative, which is unanimously preferred to the status quo, so that in the future they can bundle this same alternative with a divisive alternative that otherwise would not pass. Gridlock of this form is more likely to occur during periods of economic or political stability and, when it occurs, suggests that traditional measures of legislator ideology will overstate polarization. From the voter's perspective, gridlock occurs at an inefficiently high frequency. This state of "excess gridlock" is driven by the voter being forward-looking and lacking commitment power.
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We present a two-period collective bargaining model with asymmetric information and a persistent agenda setter. Voters have private information about their policy preferences. Only upon the failure of the initial proposal does the...
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We present a two-period collective bargaining model with asymmetric information and a persistent agenda setter. Voters have private information about their policy preferences. Only upon the failure of the initial proposal does the setter have a chance to revise it and call for a re-vote. The status quo gets implemented if the revised proposal fails. We establish the existence of an informative equilibrium for any number of voters and any q-rule, where the first-period voting enables the voters to signal their policy preferences and the setter makes a more compromising proposal upon more negative votes. We apply the model to identify important sources that improve political outcomes regarding individuals' welfare and policy progress. Specifically, we show that the setter's reconsideration opportunity improves her welfare and alleviates policy gridlock, which is defined as the outcome of no policy change. Meanwhile, the information revealed through voting can also benefit the voters, provided that the setter is sufficiently constrained by the voting rule. In addition, voters' less sophistication can not only make a further Pareto improvement for themselves and the setter but can also avoid policy gridlock to a larger extent.
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This paper presents a theory of common agency lobbying in which policy interested lobbies can first influence the choice of a proto-coalition and then influence the legislative bargaining over policy within that coalition. The equ...
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This paper presents a theory of common agency lobbying in which policy interested lobbies can first influence the choice of a proto-coalition and then influence the legislative bargaining over policy within that coalition. The equilibrium policy in the legislative bargaining stage maximizes the aggregate policy utility of the coalition members and the lobbies, but lobbying can also lead to the preservation of the status quo and lobby-induced gridlock. When the status quo does not persist, the policy out come is largely determined by the selection of a coalition, since legislative bargaining under unanimity within the coalition leads to a coalition-efficient policy regardless of the identity of the proposer. An example is presented to identify the types of equilibria and provide a full characterization of an equilibrium.
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This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power, and in certain states o...
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This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power, and in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically inefficient and inertial around the previously agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and helps explain the empirical observation that the distribution of actual interest rate changes has a mode of zero.
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摘要 :
I consider the role of news provided by the media as signals used by investors to learn about partisan conflict. Higher partisan conflict induces uncertainty (by increasing the probability of crises) and gridlock (making tax refor...
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I consider the role of news provided by the media as signals used by investors to learn about partisan conflict. Higher partisan conflict induces uncertainty (by increasing the probability of crises) and gridlock (making tax reforms less likely), both affecting investment returns. The true degree of political disagreement is unobservable to investors, who create expectations based on the observation of informative signals. Using a Bayesian learning model, I illustrate how these signals affect investment decisions. To the extent crises are severe enough, an increase in the partisan conflict reduces expected returns and induces lower investment.
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